Related papers: Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Comple…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
Stability is a central property in learning and statistics promising the output of an algorithm $A$ does not change substantially when applied to similar datasets $S$ and $S'$. It is an elementary fact that any sufficiently stable algorithm…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
Concurrent accesses to databases are typically encapsulated in transactions in order to enable isolation from other concurrent computations and resilience to failures. Modern databases provide transactions with various semantics…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
The Stable Marriage Problem is to find a one-to-one matching for two equally sized sets of agents. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized match maker, a very large number of…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
In variable or graph selection problems, finding a right-sized model or controlling the number of false positives is notoriously difficult. Recently, a meta-algorithm called Stability Selection was proposed that can provide reliable…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
Algorithmic stability is a concept from learning theory that expresses the degree to which changes to the input data (e.g., removal of a single data point) may affect the outputs of a regression algorithm. Knowing an algorithm's stability…
In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
This paper studies the problem of stability of a parameterized delay differential equations (DDE see equation (0.1)). After discretizing the DDE (0.1), we show that the problem can be equivalently casted into a semi-definite programming…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
One of the main reasons for topological persistence being useful in data analysis is that it is backed up by a stability (isometry) property: persistence diagrams of $1$-parameter persistence modules are stable in the sense that the…