Related papers: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Parti…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee,…
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized…
The game of best choice (or "secretary problem") is a model for making an irrevocable decision among a fixed number of candidate choices that are presented sequentially in random order, one at a time. Because the classically optimal…
Real-life agents seldom have unlimited reasoning power. In this paper, we propose and study a new formal notion of computationally bounded strategic ability in multi-agent systems. The notion characterizes the ability of a set of agents to…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
In this paper we investigate the notion of legibility in sequential decision-making in the context of teams and teamwork. There have been works that extend the notion of legibility to sequential decision making, for deterministic and for…
We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some specific information about their preferences. Afterwards, a…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
The aim of this study is to formally express awareness for modeling practical agent communication. The notion of awareness has been proposed as a set of propositions for each agent, to which he/she pays attention, and has contributed to…
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…
We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…