Related papers: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Parti…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.
Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study a well-known technique of using absoluteness for giving choice-free proofs to some statements which are known to be provable with the axiom of choice. The idea is to reduce the problem to an inner model where the axiom of choice…
We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…
There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport…
We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive…