Related papers: PIXHELL Attack: Leaking Sensitive Information from…
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar…
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical…
Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…
Modern corporations physically separate their sensitive computational infrastructure from public or other accessible networks in order to prevent cyber-attacks. However, attackers still manage to infect these networks, either by means of an…
Personal data has become one of the most valuable assets and lucrative targets for attackers in the modern digital world. This includes personal identification information (PII), medical records, legal information, biometric data, and…
In this paper, we show that attackers can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones via covert magnetic signals. The proposed covert channel works even if a smartphone is kept inside a Faraday shielding case, which…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Infrared (IR) light is invisible to humans, but cameras are optically sensitive to this type of light. In this paper, we show how attackers can use surveillance cameras and infrared light to establish bi-directional covert communication…
Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic…
Covert channels can be used to circumvent system and network policies by establishing communications that have not been considered in the design of the computing system. We construct a covert channel between different computing systems that…
Air-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has been demonstrated as an effective method for exfiltrating data…
We present a novel mechanism to construct a covert channel based on page faults. A page fault is an event that occurs when a process or a thread tries to access a page of memory that is not currently mapped to its address space. The kernel…
Modern optical mouse sensors, with their advanced precision and high responsiveness, possess an often overlooked vulnerability: they can be exploited for side-channel attacks. This paper introduces Mic-E-Mouse, the first-ever side-channel…
Covert channel networks are a well-known method for circumventing the security measures organizations put in place to protect their networks from adversarial attacks. This paper introduces a novel method based on bit-rate modulation for…
Investigating network covert channels in smartphones has become increasingly important as smartphones have recently replaced the role of traditional computers. Smartphones are subject to traditional computer network covert channel…
Speaker recognition is a popular topic in biometric authentication and many deep learning approaches have achieved extraordinary performances. However, it has been shown in both image and speech applications that deep neural networks are…
Although organizations are continuously making concerted efforts to harden their systems against network attacks by air-gapping critical systems, attackers continuously adapt and uncover covert channels to exfiltrate data from air-gapped…
The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a…
Attacks based on power analysis have been long existing and studied, with some recent works focused on data exfiltration from victim systems without using conventional communications (e.g., WiFi). Nonetheless, prior works typically rely on…
Physical isolation from external networks - an airgap - aims to minimize exposure to remote attacks. Yet capable adversaries still achieve code execution on air-gapped systems, and prior work has shown that they can then wirelessly…