Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards as they type. Most existing approaches in this field ignore the negative impacts of typing patterns and environmental noise in their results. This paper seeks to address these shortcomings by proposing an applicable method that takes into account the user's typing pattern in a realistic environment. Our method achieved an average success rate of 43% across all our case studies when considering real-world scenarios.
@article{arxiv.2403.08740,
title = {Acoustic Side Channel Attack on Keyboards Based on Typing Patterns},
author = {Alireza Taheritajar and Reza Rahaeimehr},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.08740},
year = {2024}
}