Related papers: Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities
The balance between convergence and diversity is a key issue of evolutionary multi-objective optimization. The recently proposed stable matching-based selection provides a new perspective to handle this balance under the framework of…
An approach to analyse the properties of a particle system is to compare it with different processes to understand when one of them is larger than other ones. The main technique for that is coupling, which may not be easy to construct. We…
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…
Lotteries are commonly employed in school choice to fairly resolve priority ties; however, current practices typically keep students uninformed about their lottery outcomes at the time of preference submission. This paper advocates for…
Strategic suppression of grades, as well as early offers and contracts, are well-known phenomena in the matching process where graduating students apply to jobs or further education. In this paper, we consider a game theoretic model of…
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…
In this paper, we propose a new constraint, called shift-consistency, for solving matrix/tensor completion problems in the context of recommender systems. Our method provably guarantees several key mathematical properties: (1) satisfies a…
Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after the reforms:…
In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
Assume that $n = 2k$ potential roommates each have an ordered preference of the $n-1$ others. A stable matching is a perfect matching of the $n$ roommates in which no two unmatched people prefer each other to their matched partners. In…
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each…
We describe a solution to the student-project allocation problem using simulated annealing. The problem involves assigning students to projects, where each student has ranked a fixed number of projects in order of preference. Each project…
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…
The academic job market for new statisticians is highly congested at the interview stage, where departments must rank and select candidates from large applicant pools without credible signals of candidate interest. As a result, interviews…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own.…
In this work, we consider a school choice scenario where a student does not exactly know which college is better for her. Although it is hard for a student to obtain an exact preference, she can usually compare specific features of…
I settle the computational complexity of student-project-resource matching-allocation problems, in which students and resources are assigned to projects \citep{pc2017}. A project's capacity for students is endogenously determined by the…