Related papers: Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the well-known stable matching problem. Teo and Sethuraman proved that, for each instance of the stable roommates problem in a complete graph, there exists a linear inequality…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their preferences. It is being used in many settings, such as school choice, course allocations and residency matches. In some cases, several `items' are given to each participant.…
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools, when students have different utilities for schools and schools have capacity. There are additional group fairness considerations over students that can be captured either by concave…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), which involves the assignment of students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. Previously considered criteria for evaluating proposed mechanisms…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district's objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools.…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
We consider preference disaggregation in the context of multiple criteria sorting. The value function parameters and thresholds separating the classes are inferred from the Decision Maker's (DM's) assignment examples. Given the multiplicity…
Various models have been recently proposed to reflect and predict different properties of complex networks. However, the community structure, which is one of the most important properties, is not well studied and modeled. In this paper, we…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…