Related papers: Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…
Clustering is a foundational problem in machine learning with numerous applications. As machine learning increases in ubiquity as a backend for automated systems, concerns about fairness arise. Much of the current literature on fairness…
Universities regularly face the challenging task of assigning classes to thousands of students while considering their preferences, along with course schedules and capacities. Ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of course allocation…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…
We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a collective ranking. A distinctive feature of our setting is that agents are matched to alternatives. Applications include rankings of colleges or academic…
We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
Often fairness assumptions need to be made in order to establish liveness properties of distributed systems, but in many situations they lead to false conclusions. This document presents a research agenda aiming at laying the foundations of…
Human lives are increasingly being affected by the outcomes of automated decision-making systems and it is essential for the latter to be, not only accurate, but also fair. The literature of algorithmic fairness has grown considerably over…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side consists of students and the other side of schools with capacity constraints. We study how to optimally increase the capacities of the schools so as to obtain a stable and perfect…
We consider a general class of low complexity distributed scheduling algorithms in wireless networks, maximal scheduling with priorities, where a maximal set of transmitting links in each time slot are selected according to certain…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…