Related papers: Distributed Agreement in the Arrovian Framework
Pluralistic alignment is typically operationalised as preference aggregation: producing responses that span (Overton), steer toward (Steerable), or proportionally represent (Distributional) diverse human values. We argue that aggregation…
We consider the problem of non-uniform vote aggregation, and in particular, the algorithmic aspects associated with the aggregation process. For a novel class of weighted distance measures on votes, we present two different aggregation…
The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) ensures that the revealed preference (i) is a preference relation (i.e., it is complete and transitive) and (ii) rationalizes the choices. However, when WARP fails, either one of these two…
In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them(e.g., transitivity when describing preferences).…
Distributed consensus, the ability to reach agreement in the face of failures and asynchrony, is a fundamental primitive for constructing reliable distributed systems from unreliable components. The Paxos algorithm is synonymous with…
Distributed averaging is among the most relevant cooperative control problems, with applications in sensor and robotic networks, distributed signal processing, data fusion, and load balancing. Consensus and gossip algorithms have been…
We study distributed convex optimization with two ubiquitous forms of coupling: consensus constraints and global affine equalities. We first design a linearized method of multipliers for the consensus optimization problem. Without…
In several decision-making problems, alternatives should be ranked on the basis of paired comparisons between them. We present an axiomatic approach for the universal ranking problem with arbitrary preference intensities, incomplete and…
We study distributed computation in synchronous dynamic networks where an omniscient adversary controls the unidirectional communication links. Its behavior is modeled as a sequence of directed graphs representing the active (i.e. timely)…
The definition of preferences assigned to individuals is a concept that concerns many disciplines, from economics, with the search of an acceptable outcome for an ensemble of individuals, to decision making an analysis of vote systems. We…
Combinatorial preference aggregation has many applications in AI. Given the exponential nature of these preferences, compact representations are needed and ($m$)CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential and global voting are two…
This paper studies distributed convex optimization with both affine equality and nonlinear inequality couplings through the duality analysis. We first formulate the dual of the coupling-constraint problem and reformulate it as a consensus…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step…
We study two fundamental problems of distributed computing, consensus and approximate agreement, through a novel approach for proving lower bounds and impossibility results, that we call the asynchronous speedup theorem. For a given…
Incomputability results in Formal Logic and the Theory of Computation (i.e., incompleteness and undecidability) have deep implications for the foundations of mathematics and computer science. Likewise, Social Choice Theory, a branch of…
This paper considers distributed resource allocation problems (DRAPs) with a coupled constraint for real-time systems. Based on primal-dual methods, we adopt a control perspective for optimization algorithm design by synthesizing a safe…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
The classical Arrow's Theorem answers "how can $n$ voters obtain a collective preference on a set of outcomes, if they have to obey certain constraints?" We give an analogue in the judgment aggregation framework of List and Pettit,…
Eliciting preferences from human judgements is inherently imprecise, yet most decision analysis methods force a single priority vector from pairwise comparisons, discarding the information embedded in inconsistencies. We instead leverage…