Related papers: Distributed Agreement in the Arrovian Framework
Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a…
We generalize the Arrow's impossibility theorem--a key result in social choice theory--to the setting where the arity $k$ of the relation under consideration is greater than $2$. Some special but natural properties of $k$-ary relations are…
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions…
Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are…
Motivated by the common academic problem of allocating papers to referees for conference reviewing we propose a novel mechanism for solving the assignment problem when we have a two sided matching problem with preferences from one side (the…
We explore the probabilistic foundations of shared control in complex dynamic environments. In order to do this, we formulate shared control as a random process and describe the joint distribution that governs its behavior. For…
Ranking and comparing items is crucial for collecting information about preferences in many areas, from marketing to politics. The Mallows rank model is among the most successful approaches to analyse rank data, but its computational…
In this paper, we study distributed consensus in the radio network setting. We produce new upper and lower bounds for this problem in an abstract MAC layer model that captures the key guarantees provided by most wireless MAC layers. In more…
Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the…
I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
Proportional representation (PR) is often discussed in voting settings as a major desideratum. For the past century or so, it is common both in practice and in the academic literature to jump to single transferable vote (STV) as the…
We consider a classical problem in choice theory -- vote aggregation -- using novel distance measures between permutations that arise in several practical applications. The distance measures are derived through an axiomatic approach, taking…
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle.…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
This paper studies preference aggregation under risk. In our model, each agent has an incomplete preference relation represented by a set of expected utility functions. The classical Pareto principle is silent on agreement involving…
The paper studies the problem of reaching agreement in a distributed message-passing system prone to crash failures. Crashes are generated by \constrained\ adversaries - a \wadapt\ adversary, who has to fix in advance the set of $f$…
To the best of our knowledge, a complete characterization of the domains that escape the famous Arrow's impossibility theorem remains an open question. We believe that different ways of proving Arrovian theorems illuminate this problem.…
In distributed systems with asymmetric trust, each participant is free to make its own trust assumptions about others, captured by an asymmetric quorum system. This contrasts with ordinary, symmetric quorum systems and threshold models,…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a…