Related papers: Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Achieving Bayesian Perfec…
To facilitate effective, safe deployment in the real world, individual robots must reason about interactions with other agents, which often occur without explicit communication. Recent work has identified game theory, particularly the…
Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games: therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decentralised optimisation…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…
This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…
This work proposes a policy learning algorithm for seeking generalised feedback Nash equilibria (GFNE) in $N_P$-player noncooperative dynamic games. We consider linear-quadratic games with stochastic dynamics and design a best-response…
Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most successful algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in imperfect information games. However, CFR's reliance on full game-tree traversals limits its scalability. For this reason,…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…
Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former:…
Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show that the CS…
We consider learning approximate Nash equilibria for discrete-time mean-field games with nonlinear stochastic state dynamics subject to both average and discounted costs. To this end, we introduce a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator,…
A multi-agent system operates in an uncertain environment about which agents have different and time varying beliefs that, as time progresses, converge to a common belief. A global utility function that depends on the realized state of the…
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…
We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame --…
Large dynamic economies with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks are central to many important applications, yet their equilibrium analysis remains computationally challenging. This is because the standard solution approach, rational…
The competition between radar and jammer is one emerging issue in modern electronic warfare, which in principle can be viewed as a non-cooperative game with two players. In this work, the competition between a frequency agile (FA) radar and…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…