Related papers: Optimal Strategy in the Werewolf Game: A Theoretic…
Decoding strategies play a pivotal role in text generation for modern language models, yet a puzzling gap divides theory and practice. Surprisingly, strategies that should intuitively be optimal, such as Maximum a Posteriori (MAP), often…
This paper investigates the application of game-theoretic principles combined with advanced Kalman filtering techniques to enhance maritime target tracking systems. Specifically, the paper presents a two-player, imperfect information,…
Betting games provide a natural setting to capture how information yields strategic advantage. The Kelly criterion for betting, long a cornerstone of portfolio theory and information theory, admits an interpretation in the limit of…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
We explore the twin questions of when and why the strategy method creates behavioral distortions in the elicitation of choices in laboratory studies of sequential games. While such distortions have been widely documented, the theoretical…
An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…
Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability…
We study the prophet inequality when the gambler has an access only to a single sample from each distribution. Rubinstein, Wang and Weinberg showed that an optimal guarantee of 1/2 can be achieved when the underlying matroid has rank 1,…
We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed agent about actions to take over time. The agent takes…
Bayesian optimal experiments that maximize the information gained from collected data are critical to efficiently identify behavioral models. We extend a seminal method for designing Bayesian optimal experiments by introducing two…
We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through…
In a monogamy-of-entanglement (MoE) game, two players who do not communicate try to simultaneously guess a referee's measurement outcome on a shared quantum state they prepared. We study the prototypical example of a game where the referee…
We analyse Ping-Pong protocol from the point of view of a game. The analysis helps us in understanding the different strategies of a sender and an eavesdropper to gain the maximum payoff in the game. The study presented here characterizes…
Information sharing between individuals is crucial to improve performance in collective tasks. However, in a competitive world, individuals may be reluctant to share information with the others, and it is still unclear how the presence of…
In this work, we study stochastic one-shot games where agents' utilities depend on the collective strategy profiles of other agents as well as on some well-behaved randomness. While each decision-maker is agnostic to the random variable's…
Recent analysis of empirical data [F. Radicchi, A. Baronchelli & L.A.N. Amaral. PloS ONE 7, e029910 (2012)] showed that humans adopt L\'evy flight strategies when exploring the bid space in on-line auctions. A game theoretical model proved…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
This work addresses the classic machine learning problem of online prediction with expert advice. We consider the finite-horizon version of this zero-sum, two-person game. Using verification arguments from optimal control theory, we view…
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…
We suggest a new algorithm for two-person zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games focusing on stationary strategies. Given a positive real $\epsilon$, let us call a stochastic game $\epsilon$-ergodic, if its values from any two initial…