Related papers: Monetizing digital content with network effects: A…

Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…

We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…

In many shopping scenarios, e.g., in online shopping, customers have a large menu of options to choose from. However, most of the buyers do not browse all the options and make decision after considering only a small part of the menu. To…

We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…

As an alternative to rigid DRM measures, ways of marketing virtual goods through multi-level or networked marketing have raised some interest. This report is a first approach to multi-level markets for virtual goods from the viewpoint of…

We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains from which agents' values come from -- can capture arbitrarily…

We consider a mechanism design problem for energy procurement, when there is one buyer and one seller, and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The seller can generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants,…

We model social media as collections of users producing and consuming content. Users value consuming content, but doing so uses up their scarce attention, and hence they prefer content produced by more able users. Users also value receiving…

We investigate a dynamic model of network marketing in a small-world network structure artificially constructed similarly to the Watts-Strogatz network model. Different from the traditional marketing, consumers can also play the role of the…

AI systems have increasingly become our gateways to the Internet. We argue that just as advertising has driven the monetization of web search and social media, so too will commercial incentives shape the content served by AI. Unlike…

We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…

We want to find the optimal strategy for displaying advertisements e.g. banners, videos, in given locations at given times under some realistic dynamic constraints. Our primary goal is to maximize the expected revenue in a given period of…

We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…

Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her…

We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…

Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…

Designing networks with specified collective properties is useful in a variety of application areas, enabling the study of how given properties affect the behavior of network models, the downscaling of empirical networks to workable sizes,…

We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional…

In this work we study for the first time the interaction between marketing and network effects. We build a model in which the online firm starts with an initial user base and controls the growth of the user base by choosing the intensity of…

The online retailers network models are considered. In some nodes of the network consumers are located. Each consumer wishes to purchase a particular product at minimal cost due to the price of goods and transport corruption costs. Also, in…