Related papers: An NP-hard generalization of Nim
We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…
A working definition of the term \quantum game" is developed in an attempt to gain insights into aspects of quantum mechanics via game theory.
A growing number of machine learning architectures, such as Generative Adversarial Networks, rely on the design of games which implement a desired functionality via a Nash equilibrium. In practice these games have an implicit complexity…
We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the…
In this note we are interested in a relevant generalized Nash equilibrium problem, which was proposed by Rosen in 1965. An existence result is established in the general setting of quasiconvexity, which is independent from the one given by…
Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
We know that the Nash equilibria of a game cannot be computed efficiently unless $P = PPAD$. But can they be learned? Are there dynamics that (1) can be computed efficiently by the players at each strategy profile and (2) are guaranteed to…
Decoding how rational agents should behave in shared systems remains a critical challenge within theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and economics studies. Central to this challenge is the task of computing the solution…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of $\lambda$-Lipschitz games in which every player's payoff function is $\lambda$-Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit…
Nim is a well-known combinatorial game in which two players alternately remove stones from distinct piles. A player who removes the last stone wins under the normal play rule, while a player loses under the mis\`ere play rule. In this…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $N$-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From…
We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
We present a direct reduction from k-player games to 2-player games that preserves approximate Nash equilibrium. Previously, the computational equivalence of computing approximate Nash equilibrium in k-player and 2-player games was…
The recently defined class of integer programming games (IPG) models situations where multiple self-interested decision makers interact, with their strategy sets represented by a finite set of linear constraints together with integer…