Related papers: Socially efficient mechanism on the minimum budget

We study the problem of reducing test-time acquisition costs in classification systems. Our goal is to learn decision rules that adaptively select sensors for each example as necessary to make a confident prediction. We model our system as…

Network sharing has become a key feature of various enablers of the next generation network, such as network function virtualization and fog computing architectures. Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for achieving…

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are…

We study a model of collective real-time decision-making (or learning) in a social network operating in an uncertain environment, for which no a priori probabilistic model is available. Instead, the environment's impact on the agents in the…

We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…

A central challenge in using price signals to coordinate the electricity consumption of a group of users is the operator's lack of knowledge of the users due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we develop a two-time-scale incentive…

It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…

We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types. For this pay-per-click market, we provide an efficient mechanism that maximizes social welfare. In particular,…

We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…

Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders.…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among…

We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. We consider arguably the simplest form of mechanisms -- the fixed-price mechanisms, where the…

The paper addresses large-scale, convex optimization problems that need to be solved in a distributed way by agents communicating according to a random time-varying graph. Specifically, the goal of the network is to minimize the sum of…

A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…

This paper presents karma mechanisms, a novel approach to the repeated allocation of a scarce resource among competing agents over an infinite time. Examples include deciding which ride hailing trip requests to serve during peak demand,…

In several smart city applications, multiple resources must be allocated among competing agents that are coupled through such shared resources and are constrained --- either through limitations of communication infrastructure or privacy…

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a…

In this paper, we propose a fully distributed algorithm for second-order continuous-time multi-agent systems to solve the distributed optimization problem. The global objective function is a sum of private cost functions associated with the…

In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…