Related papers: Socially efficient mechanism on the minimum budget
Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the…
Collective migration of animals in a cohesive group is rendered possible by a strategic distribution of tasks among members: some track the travel route, which is time and energy-consuming, while the others follow the group by interacting…
In this paper, we study the problem of distributed multi-agent optimization over a network, where each agent possesses a local cost function that is smooth and strongly convex. The global objective is to find a common solution that…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
While the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ensures incentive compatibility for a static one-shot game, it does not appear to be feasible to construct a dominant truth-telling mechanism for agents that are stochastic dynamic systems.…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
Selecting the most influential agent in a network has huge practical value in applications. However, in many scenarios, the graph structure can only be known from agents' reports on their connections. In a self-interested setting, agents…
We propose a model for the dynamics of a social system, which includes diffusive effects and a biased rule for spin-flips, reproducing the effect of strategic choices. This model is able to mimic some phenomena taking place during marketing…
In this work, we study the problem of online mechanism design for resources allocation and pricing in cloud computing (RAPCC). We show that in general the allocation problems in RAPCC are NP-hard, and therefore we focus on designing…
Self-organising multi-agent systems regulate their components' behaviour voluntarily, according to a set of socially-constructed, mutually-agreed, and mutable social arrangements. In some systems, these arrangements may be applied with a…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
In this work we deploy a mechanism design approach for allocating a divisible commodity (electricity in our example) among consumers. We consider each consumer with an associated personal valuation function of the energy resource during a…
We consider a class of discrete optimization problems that aim to maximize a submodular objective function subject to a distributed partition matroid constraint. More precisely, we consider a networked scenario in which multiple agents…
This paper formulates a time-varying social-welfare maximization problem for distribution grids with distributed energy resources (DERs) and develops online distributed algorithms to identify (and track) its solutions. In the considered…
Given a graph $G$, a community structure $\mathcal{C}$, and a budget $k$, the fair influence maximization problem aims to select a seed set $S$ ($|S|\leq k$) that maximizes the influence spread while narrowing the influence gap between…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
Athey and Segal introduced an efficient budget-balanced mechanism for a dynamic stochastic model with quasilinear payoffs and private values, using the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show that this implementation is…
This paper deals with an optimization problem over a network of agents, where the cost function is the sum of the individual objectives of the agents and the constraint set is the intersection of local constraints. Most existing methods…
We introduce a simple network model that is inspired by social information networks such as twitter. Agents are nodes, connecting to another agent by building a directed edge has a cost, and reaching other agents via short directed paths…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…