Related papers: Socially efficient mechanism on the minimum budget
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information because the agents' valuation functions are taken to be private…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
In industrial scenarios involving multi-agent collective decision-making, centralized decision-making may not be admissible due to restrictive access to individual local information, while the conflicts between participants' self-interest…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
We consider allocation of a resource to multiple interested users with a constraint that if the resource is allocated to user $i$ then it can not be allocated simultaneously to a predefined set of users $\cS_i$ . This scenario arises in…
In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A…
We consider a setting where $p$ public resources are to be allocated among $n$ competing and strategic agents so as to maximize social welfare (the objects should be allocated to those who value them the most). This is called allocative…
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., maximise social utility) and individually rational…
This paper seeks to establish a framework for directing a society of simple, specialized, self-interested agents to solve what traditionally are posed as monolithic single-agent sequential decision problems. What makes it challenging to use…
We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms that are…
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
Social utility maximization refers to the process of allocating resources in such a way that the sum of agents' utilities is maximized under the system constraints. Such allocation arises in several problems in the general area of…
It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG…
Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages the ubiquity of sensor-equipped mobile devices to collect data. To achieve good quality for crowd sensing, incentive mechanisms are indispensable to attract more participants. Most of existing…
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the minimal cost of acquisition and maximal efficiency, they…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…