Related papers: Socially efficient mechanism on the minimum budget
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker can be employed at only one firm. While firm utilities over…
We study collaborative normal mean estimation, where $m$ strategic agents collect i.i.d samples from a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ at a cost. They all wish to estimate the mean $\mu$. By sharing data with each other,…
This paper presented insights into the implementation of transactive multi-agent systems over flow networks where local resources are decentralized. Agents have local resource demand and supply, and are interconnected through a flow network…
Many multiagent systems rely on collective decision-making among self-interested agents, which raises deep questions about coalition formation and stability. We study social choice with endogenous, outcome-contingent transfers, where agents…
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference…
This paper investigates distributed control and incentive mechanisms to coordinate distributed energy resources (DERs) with both continuous and discrete decision variables as well as device dynamics in distribution grids. We formulate a…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to follow that minimizes the social cost (i.e., travel…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized Second…
Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms. We introduce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (strategy-proof) mechanism for selecting an influential vertex in…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
Autonomous agents can adopt socially-aware behaviors to reduce social costs, mimicking the way animals interact in nature and humans in society. We present a new approach to model socially-aware decision-making that includes two key…
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective…
Distributed optimization for resource allocation problems is investigated and a sub-optimal continuous-time algorithm is proposed. Our algorithm has lower order dynamics than others to reduce burdens of computation and communication, and is…
We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…
Collaborative Edge Computing (CEC) is an effective method that improves the performance of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) systems by offloading computation tasks from busy edge servers (ESs) to idle ones. However, ESs usually belong to…
We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single…
We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we…