Related papers: Stackelberg games with the third party

Zero-sum stochastic games have found important applications in a variety of fields, from machine learning to economics. Work on this model has primarily focused on the computation of Nash equilibrium due to its effectiveness in solving…

In modern buildings renewable energy generators and storage devices are spreading, and consequently the role of the users in the power grid is shifting from passive to active. We design a demand response scheme that exploits the prosumers'…

We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies…

This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one…

The emerging social network platforms enable users to share their own opinions, as well as to exchange opinions with others. However, adversarial network perturbation, where malicious users intentionally spread their extreme opinions,…

We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…

The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…

This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…

This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing…

In sponsored content and service markets, the content and service providers are able to subsidize their target mobile users through directly paying the mobile network operator, to lower the price of the data/service access charged by the…

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after…

We study nonzero-sum stochastic switching games. Two players compete for market dominance through controlling (via timing options) the discrete-state market regime $M$. Switching decisions are driven by a continuous stochastic factor $X$…

This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of…

Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…

Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian…

We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…

This paper studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where…