In modern buildings renewable energy generators and storage devices are spreading, and consequently the role of the users in the power grid is shifting from passive to active. We design a demand response scheme that exploits the prosumers' flexibility to provide ancillary services to the main grid. We propose a hierarchical scheme to coordinate the interactions between the distribution system operator and a community of smart prosumers. The framework inherits characteristics from price-based and incentive-based schemes and it retains the advantages of both. We cast the problem as a Stackelberg game with the prosumers as followers and the distribution system operator as leader. We solve the resulting bilevel optimization program via a KKT reformulation, proving the existence and the convergence to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, we provide numerical simulations to corroborate our claims on the benefits of the proposed framework.
@article{arxiv.2204.08730,
title = {A Stackelberg game for incentive-based demand response in energy markets},
author = {Marta Fochesato and Carlo Cenedese and John Lygeros},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.08730},
year = {2022}
}
Comments
Accepted to 61st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2022