This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.
@article{arxiv.2506.07316,
title = {Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics},
author = {Azhar Iqbal and Ishan Honhaga and Eyoel Teffera and Anthony Perry and Robin Baker and Glenn Pearce and Claudia Szabo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.07316},
year = {2025}
}