Related papers: Information Compression in Dynamic Games

We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

We study the computational complexity of solving stochastic games with mean-payoff objectives. Instead of identifying special classes in which simple strategies are sufficient to play $\epsilon$-optimally, or form $\epsilon$-Nash…

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…

We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…

The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…

Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination.…

Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…

Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…

Among the strategic choices made by today's economic actors are choices about algorithms and computational resources. Different access to computational resources may result in a kind of economic asymmetry analogous to information asymmetry.…

There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…