Related papers: Neighborhood Stability in Assignments on Graphs
In many domains (e.g. Internet of Things, neuroimaging) signals are naturally supported on graphs. These graphs usually convey information on similarity between the values taken by the signal at the corresponding vertices. An interest of…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
Self-stabilization is a versatile technique to withstand any transient fault in a distributed system. Mobile robots (or agents) are one of the emerging trends in distributed computing as they mimic autonomous biologic entities. The…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
We study four NP-hard optimal seat arrangement problems [Bodlaender et al., 2020a], which each have as input a set of n agents, where each agent has cardinal preferences over other agents, and an n-vertex undirected graph (called seat…
Addressing issues of social diversity, we introduce a model of housing transactions between agents who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. A key assumption is that agents' preferences for a location depend on both an intrinsic…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have recently been demonstrated to perform well on a variety of network-based tasks such as decentralized control and resource allocation, and provide computationally efficient methods for these tasks which have…
A neighborhood graph, which represents the instances as vertices and their relations as weighted edges, is the basis of many semi-supervised and relational models for node labeling and link prediction. Most methods employ a sequential…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
Acyclic preferences recently appeared as an elegant way to model many distributed systems. An acyclic instance admits a unique stable configuration, which can reveal the performance of the system. In this paper, we give the statistical…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…
Graph filtering is the cornerstone operation in graph signal processing (GSP). Thus, understanding it is key in developing potent GSP methods. Graph filters are local and distributed linear operations, whose output depends only on the local…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…