Related papers: Neighborhood Stability in Assignments on Graphs
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
We study graphs and two-player games in which rewards are assigned to states, and the goal of the players is to satisfy or dissatisfy certain property of the generated outcome, given as a mean payoff property. Since the notion of…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
We study preferential attachment mechanisms in random graphs that are parameterized by (i) a constant bias affecting the degree-biased distribution on the vertex set and (ii) the distribution of times at which new vertices are created by…
We propose a new variant of the group activity selection problem (GASP), where the agents are placed on a social network and activities can only be assigned to connected subgroups. We show that if multiple groups can simultaneously engage…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
We examine the problem of gathering $k \geq 2$ agents (or multi-agent rendezvous) in dynamic graphs which may change in every synchronous round but remain always connected ($1$-interval connectivity) [KLO10]. The agents are identical and…
This paper analyzes the problem of assigning weights to edges incrementally in a dynamic complete bipartite graph consisting of producer and consumer nodes. The objective is to minimize the overall cost while satisfying certain constraints.…
Graph planning gives rise to fundamental algorithmic questions such as shortest path, traveling salesman problem, etc. A classical problem in discrete planning is to consider a weighted graph and construct a path that maximizes the sum of…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network, in…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…