Related papers: Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and T…
If a game has a Nash equilibrium with probability values that are either zero or Omega(1) then this equilibrium can be found exhaustively in polynomial time. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that there is a PTAS for the games whose equilibria…
Game theoretic methods have become popular for planning and prediction in situations involving rich multi-agent interactions. However, these methods often assume the existence of a single local Nash equilibria and are hence unable to handle…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…
In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…
Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) is primarily focused on learning the equilibria of simulation-based games. Recent approaches have tackled this problem by learning a uniform approximation of the game's utilities, and then applying…
The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in…
We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…
Can players sustain long-run trust when their equilibrium beliefs are shaped by machine-learning methods that penalize complexity? I study a game in which an infinite sequence of agents with one-period recall decides whether to place trust…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…