Related papers: Manipulation of Belief Aggregation Rules
Risk aggregation is a popular method used to estimate the sum of a collection of financial assets or events, where each asset or event is modelled as a random variable. Applications, in the financial services industry, include insurance,…
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019,…
The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…
Collective opinions affect civic participation, governance, and societal norms. Due to the influence of opinion dynamics, many models of their formation and evolution have been developed. A commonly used approach for the study of opinion…
We present a representation of partial confidence in belief and preference that is consistent with the tenets of decision-theory. The fundamental insight underlying the representation is that if a person is not completely confident in a…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Roughly, revision treats a surprising observation…
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…
This paper studies preference aggregation under risk. In our model, each agent has an incomplete preference relation represented by a set of expected utility functions. The classical Pareto principle is silent on agreement involving…
When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where…
Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…
This paper presents a general framework for studying diverse beliefs in dynamic economies. Within this general framework, the characterization of a central-planner general equilbrium turns out to be very easy to derive, and leads to a range…
This paper explores algorithms for processing probabilistic and deterministic information when the former is represented as a belief network and the latter as a set of boolean clauses. The motivating tasks are 1. evaluating beliefs networks…
Probability measures by themselves, are known to be inappropriate for modeling the dynamics of plain belief and their excessively strong measurability constraints make them unsuitable for some representational tasks, e.g. in the context of…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
With the advent of online networks, societies are substantially more connected with individual members able to easily modify and maintain their own social links. Here, we show that active network maintenance exposes agents to confirmation…
This paper extends the applications of belief-networks to include the revision of belief commitments, i.e., the categorical acceptance of a subset of hypotheses which, together, constitute the most satisfactory explanation of the evidence…
We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…
In order to properly manage risk, practitioners must understand the aggregate risks they are exposed to. Additionally, to properly price policies and calculate bonuses the relative riskiness of individual business units must be well…
AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated…
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on…