Related papers: Manipulation of Belief Aggregation Rules
Binarizing belief aggregation addresses how to rationally aggregate individual probabilistic beliefs into collective binary beliefs. Similar to the development of judgment aggregation theory, formulating axiomatic requirements, proving…
This paper will focus on the process of 'fusing' several observations or models of uncertainty into a single resultant model. Many existing approaches to fusion use subjective quantities such as 'strengths of belief' and process these…
To make decisions we are guided by the evidence we collect, as well as the opinions of friends and neighbors. How do we integrate our private beliefs with information we obtain from our social network? To understand the strategies humans…
The theory of belief functions manages uncertainty and also proposes a set of combination rules to aggregate opinions of several sources. Some combination rules mix evidential information where sources are independent; other rules are…
We consider two-player non-zero-sum linear-quadratic Gaussian games in which both players aim to minimize a quadratic cost function while controlling a linear and stochastic state process {using linear policies}. The system is partially…
In an earlier paper [Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a correspondence was established between the choice structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief…
To estimate causal effects from observational data, an applied researcher must impose beliefs. The instrumental variables exclusion restriction, for example, represents the belief that the instrument has no direct effect on the outcome of…
Many models of economics assume that individuals distort objective probabilities. We propose a simple consistency condition on distortion functions, which we term distortion coherence, that ensures that the function commutes with…
In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to revise the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit conditions and the implicit conditions of probability assignments `me properly distinguished,…
We present a novel methodology for identifying public knowledge and eliminating the biases it creates when aggregating information in small group settings. A two stage mechanism consisting of an information market and a coordination game is…
In statistical physics, the conservation of particle number results in the equalization of the chemical potential throughout a system at equilibrium. In contrast, the homogeneity of utility in socio-economic models is usually thought to…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We propose a collective opinion formation model with a so-called confirmation bias. The confirmation bias is a psychological effect with which, in the context of opinion formation, an individual in favor of an opinion is prone to…
We propose a continuous-time nonlinear model of opinion dynamics with utility-maximizing agents connected via a social influence network. A distinguishing feature of the proposed model is the inclusion of an opinion-dependent…
This paper addresses the distributed Nash Equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games, where legitimate players' decisions are affected by potential malicious players. To describe players' behavior, we introduce a novel heterogeneous…
In order to improve forecasts, a decisionmaker often combines probabilities given by various sources, such as human experts and machine learning classifiers. When few training data are available, aggregation can be improved by incorporating…
Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equilibria. We propose instead that rational…
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function…
We propose a probabilistic model to aggregate the answers of respondents answering multiple-choice questions. The model does not assume that everyone has access to the same information, and so does not assume that the consensus answer is…
We discuss conditionalisation for Accept-Desirability models in an abstract decision-making framework, where uncertain rewards live in a general linear space, and events are special projection operators on that linear space. This abstract…