Related papers: Manipulation of Belief Aggregation Rules

The AGM theory of belief revision has become an important paradigm for investigating rational belief changes. Unfortunately, researchers working in this paradigm have restricted much of their attention to rather simple representations of…

Collective intelligence is believed to underly the remarkable success of human society. The formation of accurate shared beliefs is one of the key components of human collective intelligence. How are accurate shared beliefs formed in groups…

Traditional logic-based belief revision research focuses on designing rules to constrain the behavior of revision operators. Frameworks have been proposed to characterize iterated revision rules, but they are often too loose, leading to…

Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance…

Can players sustain long-run trust when their equilibrium beliefs are shaped by machine-learning methods that penalize complexity? I study a game in which an infinite sequence of agents with one-period recall decides whether to place trust…

We propose a relaxation of common belief called factional belief that is suitable for the analysis of strategic coordination on social networks. We show how this definition can be used to analyze revolt games on general graphs, including by…

Given a set of items and a set of evaluators who all individually rank them, how do we aggregate these evaluations into a single societal ranking? Work in social choice and statistics has produced many aggregation methods for this problem,…

This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…

The concept of reputation is widely used as a measure of trustworthiness based on ratings from members in a community. The adoption of reputation systems, however, relies on their ability to capture the actual trustworthiness of a target.…

In this paper, we explore aggregative games over networks of multi-integrator agents with coupled constraints. To reach the general Nash equilibrium of an aggregative game, a distributed strategy-updating rule is proposed by a combination…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

This note shows that under the unrestricted domain, there exists a choice liberal and Nash implementable social choice rule if and only if there are at least three players and the outcome set is at least twice as large as the player set. A…

In this paper we explore the application of methods for classical judgment aggregation in pooling probabilistic opinions on logically related issues. For this reason, we first modify the Boolean judgment aggregation framework in the way…

The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…

This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with…

In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them(e.g., transitivity when describing preferences).…

This paper investigates portfolio selection within a continuous-time financial market with regime-switching and beliefs-dependent utilities. The market coefficients and the investor's utility function both depend on the market regime, which…

We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. Voters may be "contingent" with…

The wisdom of crowds is an umbrella term for phenomena suggesting that the collective judgment or decision of a large group can be more accurate than the individual judgments or decisions of the group members. A well-known example…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…