Related papers: Manipulation of Belief Aggregation Rules
I propose a framework for an agent to change its probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information $\alpha$ is observed. Traditionally, belief change occurs by either a revision process or by an update process, depending…
This paper develops a formal critique of scalar fiscal aggregation in the IS LM BP/Mundell Fleming framework. It shows that when fiscal policy is composed of heterogeneous instruments current purchases, public investment and transfers to…
This paper revisits the limitations of the Median Voter Theorem and introduces a novel framework to analyze the optimal economic ideological positions of political parties. By incorporating Nash equilibrium, we examine the mechanisms and…
We introduce a new framework to study the group dynamics and game-theoretic considerations when voters in a committee are allowed to trade votes. This model represents a significant step forward by considering vote-for-vote trades in a…
We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given agent can…
Proper scoring rules are an essential tool to assess the predictive performance of probabilistic forecasts. However, propriety alone does not ensure an informative characterization of predictive performance and it is recommended to compare…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
A natural way to represent beliefs and the process of updating beliefs is presented by Bayesian probability theory, where belief of an agent a in P can be interpreted as a considering that P is more probable than not P. This paper attempts…
A primary motivation for reasoning under uncertainty is to derive decisions in the face of inconclusive evidence. However, Shafer's theory of belief functions, which explicitly represents the underconstrained nature of many reasoning…
We introduce a novel class of adjustment rules for a collection of beliefs. This is an extension of Lewis' imaging to absorb probabilistic evidence in generalized settings. Unlike standard tools for belief revision, our proposal may be used…
Belief revision is the process in which an agent incorporates a new piece of information together with a pre-existing set of beliefs. When the new information comes in the form of a report from another agent, then it is clear that we must…
The group identification problem asks to identify a socially qualified subgroup among a group of individuals based on their pairwise valuations. There are several different rules that can be used to determine the social qualification…
In this paper, we introduce the increasing belief criterion in association rule mining. The criterion uses a recursive application of Bayes' theorem to compute a rule's belief. Extracted rules are required to have their belief increase with…
Decision-making under uncertainty and causal thinking are fundamental aspects of intelligent reasoning. Decision-making has been well studied when the available information is considered at the associative (probabilistic) level. The…
In recent years, researchers in decision analysis and artificial intelligence (AI) have used Bayesian belief networks to build models of expert opinion. Using standard methods drawn from the theory of computational complexity, workers in…
A new approach for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is suggested. On the basis of psychological concepts (as for instance social norms and cultural coordinates), we deduce a general mechanism for the social aggregation in…
This paper studies preference aggregation under uncertainty in the multi-profile framework and characterizes a new class of aggregation rules that address classical concerns about Harsanyi's (1955) utilitarian rules. Our aggregation rules,…
In Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), a population reaches a Nash equilibrium when none of the agents can improve its objective by solely changing its strategy on its own. Roughly speaking, this equilibrium is a protection against betrayal.…
Complex systems show the capacity to aggregate information and to display coordinated activity. In the case of social systems the interaction of different individuals leads to the emergence of norms, trends in political positions, opinions,…
We propose a model of opinion formation on resource allocation among multiple topics by multiple agents, who are subject to hard budget constraints. We define a utility function for each agent and then derive a projected dynamical system…