Related papers: Farkas' Lemma and Complete Indifference
We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria $\mathcal X_\star \times \mathcal Y_\star$ in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani (2016) showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an $n…
We prove that finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant $\epsilon$ and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As…
Farkas' lemma is a fundamental result from linear programming providing linear certificates for infeasibility of systems of linear inequalities. In semidefinite programming, such linear certificates only exist for strongly infeasible linear…
The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…
The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…
We investigate stochastic utility maximization games under relative performance concerns in both finite-agent and infinite-agent (graphon) settings. An incomplete market model is considered where agents with power (CRRA) utility functions…
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on inferring…
In this paper, we investigate a competitive market involving two agents who consider both their own wealth and the wealth gap with their opponent. Both agents can invest in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky…
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…
In this note, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon linear-quadratic difference games with coupled affine inequality constraints involving both state and control variables. We show that the necessary conditions for the existence…
In this paper, we study a theoretical math problem of game theory and calculus of variations in which we minimize a functional involving two players. A general relationship between the optimal strategies for both players is presented,…
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…
In this paper we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems associated with two related noncooperative strategic games. Then we apply the Fan-KKM theorem to prove the existence of solutions to split Nash equilibrium problems…
A fair gambling is hard to be made between two spatially separated parties without introducing a trusted third party. Here we propose a novel gambling protocol, which enables fair gambling between two distant parties without the help of a…