Related papers: Identification of Information Structures in Bayesi…
Non-Bayesian social learning theory provides a framework for distributed inference of a group of agents interacting over a social network by sequentially communicating and updating beliefs about the unknown state of the world through…
Standard linear modeling approaches make potentially simplistic assumptions regarding the structure of categorical effects that may obfuscate more complex relationships governing data. For example, recent work focused on the two-way…
If the influence diagram (ID) depicting a Bayesian game is common knowledge to its players then additional assumptions may allow the players to make use of its embodied irrelevance statements. They can then use these to discover a simpler…
The Information Bottleneck (IB) is a conceptual method for extracting the most compact, yet informative, representation of a set of variables, with respect to the target. It generalizes the notion of minimal sufficient statistics from…
We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of…
When robots share the same workspace with other intelligent agents (e.g., other robots or humans), they must be able to reason about the behaviors of their neighboring agents while accomplishing the designated tasks. In practice,…
The ability of a society to make the right decisions on relevant matters relies on its capability to properly aggregate the noisy information spread across the individuals it is made of. In this paper we study the information aggregation…
A description of the environment cognition process by intelligent systems with a fixed set of system goals is suggested. Such a system is represented by the set of its goals only without any models of the system elements or the environment.…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in conflicting interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob [Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. General setting for…
We study the problem of an agent continuously faced with the decision of placing or not placing trust in an institution. The agent makes use of Bayesian learning in order to estimate the institution's true trustworthiness and makes the…
We employ a unified framework for computing the information capacity of biological signaling systems using Fisher Information. By deriving closed-form or easily computable information capacity formulas, we quantify how well different…
The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…
The correlations that can be observed between a set of variables depend on the causal structure underpinning them. Causal structures can be modeled using directed acyclic graphs, where nodes represent variables and edges denote functional…
Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…
We introduce a simple time-triggered protocol to achieve communication-efficient non-Bayesian learning over a network. Specifically, we consider a scenario where a group of agents interact over a graph with the aim of discerning the true…