Related papers: Identification of Information Structures in Bayesi…

We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that the likelihood of agents trading in a given…

As intelligent systems are developed across diverse substrates - from machine learning models and neuromorphic hardware to in vitro neural cultures - understanding what gives a system agency has become increasingly important. Existing…

Global games form a subclass of games with incomplete information where a set of agents decide actions against a regime with an underlying fundamental $\theta$ representing its power. Each agent has access to an independent noisy…

In the classical herding model, asymptotic learning refers to situations where individuals eventually take the correct action regardless of their private information. Classical results identify classes of information structures for which…

Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…

Global games are a class of incomplete information games where the payoffs exhibit strategic complementarity leading to an incentive for the agents to coordinate their actions. Such games have been used to model scenarios in many…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from…

The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…

We study strategic information transmission in a hierarchical setting where information gets transmitted through a chain of agents up to a decision maker whose action is of importance to every agent. This situation could arise whenever an…

Gaussian graphical models provide a powerful framework to reveal the conditional dependency structure between multivariate variables. The process of uncovering the conditional dependency network is known as structure learning. Bayesian…

We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…

We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…

Every interaction of a living organism with its environment involves the placement of a bet. Armed with partial knowledge about a stochastic world, the organism must decide its next step or near-term strategy, an act that implicitly or…

In this paper, a unified framework for representing uncertain information based on the notion of an interval structure is proposed. It is shown that the lower and upper approximations of the rough-set model, the lower and upper bounds of…

This paper addresses the question whether model knowledge can guide a defender to appropriate decisions, or not, when an attacker intrudes into control systems. The model-based defense scheme considered in this study, namely Bayesian…

We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state.…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…

In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…