Related papers: Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matchin…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
The seminal book of Gusfield and Irving [GI89] provides a compact and algorithmically useful way to represent the collection of stable matches corresponding to a given set of preferences. In this paper, we reinterpret the main results of…
The balance between convergence and diversity is a key issue of evolutionary multi-objective optimization. The recently proposed stable matching-based selection provides a new perspective to handle this balance under the framework of…
In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be…
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the question of whether every instance of…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter's seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number…
The online weighted matching problem is a fundamental problem in machine learning due to its numerous applications. Despite many efforts in this area, existing algorithms are either too slow or don't take $\mathrm{deadline}$ (the longest…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
The graph matching problem aims to discover a latent correspondence between the vertex sets of two observed graphs. This problem has proven to be quite challenging, with few satisfying methods that are computationally tractable and widely…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…