Related papers: Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Ou…

This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…

We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…

Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…

In this paper, we introduce a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework: Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs). In CSGs, a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent who (contrary to standard SGs) does not have direct…

In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…

Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…

Algorithms for playing in Stackelberg games have been deployed in real-world domains including airport security, anti-poaching efforts, and cyber-crime prevention. However, these algorithms often fail to take into consideration the…

We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…

There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…

Designing distributed algorithms for multi-agent problems is vital for many emerging application domains, and game-theoretic approaches are emerging as a useful paradigm to design such algorithms. However, much of the emphasis of the…

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…

The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker.…