Related papers: Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Ou…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…
Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
By utilizing tools from game theory, we develop a novel multi-period-multi-company demand response framework considering the interactions between companies (sellers of energy) and their consumers (buyers of energy). We model the…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…
We address two-player general-sum stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where the leader's policy is optimized considering the best-response follower whose policy is optimal for its reward under the leader. Existing policy gradient and value…
We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics,…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
This paper focuses on managing the cost of deliberation before action. In many problems, the overall quality of the solution reflects costs incurred and resources consumed in deliberation as well as the cost and benefit of execution, when…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…