Related papers: Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspecti…

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…

The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we…

The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…

Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in…

We consider distributed learning problem in games with an unknown cost-relevant parameter, and aim to find the Nash equilibrium while learning the true parameter. Inspired by the social learning literature, we propose a distributed…

We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent by the…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…

We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different…

Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision…

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…

The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that,…

We investigate a privacy-signaling game problem in which a sender with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The sender aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the…

Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…