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We consider a wireless channel shared by multiple transmitter-receiver pairs. Their transmissions interfere with each other. Each transmitter-receiver pair aims to maximize its long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power…
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…
We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems subject to heterogeneous uncertainty on the expected valued cost functions of the individual agents, where we assume no prior knowledge of the underlying probability distributions of the…
The decision making and management of many engineering networks involves multiple parties with conflicting interests, while each party is constituted with multiple agents. Such problems can be casted as a multi-cluster game. Each cluster is…
This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
This paper focuses on multi-agent stochastic differential games for jump-diffusion systems. On one hand, we study the multi-agent game for optimal investment in a jump-diffusion market. We derive constant Nash equilibria and provide…
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…
Despite the considerable success enjoyed by machine learning techniques in practice, numerous studies demonstrated that many approaches are vulnerable to attacks. An important class of such attacks involves adversaries changing features at…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in $m$-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the…
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with…
This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…