Related papers: Symbolic Computation of Sequential Equilibria
This paper proposes an asymmetric perturbation technique for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Perturbing payoffs or values is known to be…
This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…
Synchronous linear constraint system games are nonlocal games that verify whether or not two players share a solution to a given system of equations. Two algebraic objects associated to these games encode information about the existence of…
Game semantics aim at describing the interactive behaviour of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. In this article, we introduce a game semantics for a fragment of first order propositional logic. One…
Equilibrium logic is an approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that extends the stable-model and answer-set semantics for logic programs. In particular, it includes the general case of nested logic programs, where arbitrary Boolean combinations…
We consider the semiring of abstract finite dynamical systems up to isomorphism, with the operations of alternative and synchronous execution. We continue searching for efficient algorithms for solving polynomial equations of the form $P(X)…
A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…
A new concept of an equilibrium in games is introduced that solves an open question posed by A. Neyman.
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting,…
No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they consistently modified their behavior according to some strategy…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses behavioral strategies rather than normal form mixed strategies,…
A weakening of sequential rationality of sequential equilibrium yields Reny's (1992) weakly sequentially rational equilibrium (WSRE) in extensive-form games. WSRE requires Kreps and Wilson's (1982) consistent assessment to satisfy global…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally,…
In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors.…
We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players…