Related papers: Symbolic Computation of Sequential Equilibria
A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. One of the major approaches to analyzing games in combinatorial game theory is to break down a given game position into a disjunctive sum of multiple…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…
We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this…
In this paper we discuss three symbolic approaches for the generation of a finite difference scheme of a partial differential equation (PDE). We prove, that for a linear PDE with constant coefficients these three approaches are equivalent…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…
Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type -- such as extensive-form games, congestion or routing games, and more broadly…
In this paper, we study the class of games known as hidden-role games in which players are assigned privately to teams and are faced with the challenge of recognizing and cooperating with teammates. This model includes both popular…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
Strategic interactions often take place in an environment rife with uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium of a game is intimately related to the information available to its players. The \emph{signaling problem} abstracts the task faced…
The goal of this paper is to provide computational tools able to find a solution of a system of polynomial inequalities. The set of inequalities is reformulated as a system of polynomial equations. Three different methods, two of which…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
Solving parity games, which are equivalent to modal $\mu$-calculus model checking, is a central algorithmic problem in formal methods. Besides the standard computation model with the explicit representation of games, another important…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…