Related papers: Symbolic Computation of Sequential Equilibria

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

We describe the notion of stability of coherent systems as a framework to deal with redundancy. We define stable coherent systems and show how this notion can help the design of reliable systems. We demonstrate that the reliability of…

We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite extensive games. We define both the game trees and the strategy profiles by possibly infinite systems of corecursive equations. Certain strategy profiles are proved to be subgame…

We propose a formulation of a general-sum bimatrix game as a bipartite directed graph with the objective of establishing a correspondence between the set of the relevant structures of the graph (in particular elementary cycles) and the set…

We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…

This paper reveals a novel numerical method, the sequential test, which approves chaos through sequences of numbers observations. The method alights alongside the Lyapunov exponent and bifurcation diagram test. Explicitly elucidation of the…

This work introduces efficient symbolic algorithms for quantitative reactive synthesis. We consider resource-constrained robotic manipulators that need to interact with a human to achieve a complex task expressed in linear temporal logic.…

A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…

We outline a new algorithm to solve coupled systems of differential equations in one continuous variable $x$ (resp. coupled difference equations in one discrete variable $N$) depending on a small parameter $\epsilon$: given such a system…

Using semi-tensor product of matrices, the structures of several kinds of symmetric games are investigated via the linear representation of symmetric group in the structure vector of games as its representation space. First of all, the…

This paper studies the rational synthesis problem for multi-player games played on graphs when rational players are following subgame perfect equilibria. In these games, one player, the system, declares his strategy upfront, and the other…

We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one of the players, the social preferences of the players, or the…

A sequential quadratic programming method is designed for solving general smooth nonlinear stochastic optimization problems subject to expectation equality constraints. We consider the setting where the objective and constraint function…

Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…

We propose a computationally feasible way of deriving the identified features of models with multiple equilibria in pure or mixed strategies. It is shown that in the case of Shapley regular normal form games, the identified set is…

We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…

This work introduces a new general approach for the numerical analysis of stable equilibria to second order mean field games systems in cases where the uniqueness of solutions may fail. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a simple…