Related papers: Leveraging Noisy Observations in Zero-Sum Games

Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…

In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the adversary typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically…

We discuss a duel-type game in which Player I uses his resource continuously and Player II distributes it by discrete portions. Each player knows how much resources he and his opponent have at every moment of time. The solution of the game…

We consider a Markovian stochastic control problem with model uncertainty. The controller (intelligent player) observes only the state, and, therefore, uses feed-back (closed-loop) strategies. The adverse player (nature) who does not have a…

The network reciprocity is an important dynamic rule fostering the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals. This was reported firstly in the seminal work of Nowak and May, where individuals were arranged on the regular lattice…

This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…

The behaviour of multi-agent learning in competitive network games is often studied within the context of zero-sum games, in which convergence guarantees may be obtained. However, outside of this class the behaviour of learning is known to…

We study the problem of \emph{jamming} in multiple independent \emph{Gaussian channels} as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the \emph{waterfilling} to…

We study a version of the classical zero-sum matrix game with unknown payoff matrix and bandit feedback, where the players only observe each others actions and a noisy payoff. This generalizes the usual matrix game, where the payoff matrix…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped into the classical game of complete information where…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

In a decision-making scenario, a principal could use conditional predictions from an expert agent to inform their choice. However, this approach would introduce a fundamental conflict of interest. An agent optimizing for predictive accuracy…

We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…

We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as…

We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…

We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input…

We consider zero sum stochastic games. For every discount factor $\lambda$, a time normalization allows to represent the game as being played on the interval [0, 1]. We introduce the trajectories of cumulated expected payoff and of…

Last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics in games has attracted significant recent attention. In two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback, where only the loss of the selected action pair is observed, Fiegel et al. (2025) show a…