Related papers: Leveraging Noisy Observations in Zero-Sum Games

This paper studies a particular sensor network model which involves one single Gaussian source observed by many sensors, subject to additive independent Gaussian observation noise. Sensors communicate with the receiver over an additive…

This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of…

This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an \epsilon-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every \epsilon >0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the…

In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial Public Goods Game, one of the most famous games in Evolutionary Game Theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a number of parameters and processes, namely the topology…

We study the prophet inequality, a fundamental problem in online decision-making and optimal stopping, in a practical setting where rewards are observed only through noisy realizations and reward distributions are unknown. At each stage,…

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…

We consider a slotted-ALOHA LAN with loss-averse, noncooperative greedy users. To avoid non-Pareto equilibria, particularly deadlock, we assume probabilistic loss-averse behavior. This behavior is modeled as a modulated white noise term, in…

Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory…

In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…

In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…

We suggest that one individual holds multiple degrees of belief about an outcome, given the evidence. We then investigate the implications of such noisy probabilities for a buyer and a seller of binary options and find the odds agreed upon…

We consider a sensor-receiver pair communicating over a wireless channel in the presence of a jammer who may launch a denial-of-service attack. We formulate a zero-sum game between a coordinator that jointly designs the transmission and…

A checkers-like model game with a simplified set of rules is studied through extensive simulations of agents with different expertise and strategies. The introduction of complementary strategies, in a quite general way, provides a tool to…

This study examines the global behavior of dynamics in learning in games between two players, X and Y. We consider the simplest situation for memory asymmetry between two players: X memorizes the other Y's previous action and uses reactive…

We modeled the dynamics of a soccer match based on a network representation where players are nodes discretely clustered into homogeneous groups. Players were grouped by physical proximity, supported by the intuitive notion that competing…

Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…

The integrity of democratic elections depends on voters' access to accurate information. However, modern media environments, which are dominated by social media, provide malicious actors with unprecedented ability to manipulate elections…

We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…