Jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a game
Computer Science and Game Theory
2018-07-26 v1 Information Theory
Networking and Internet Architecture
math.IT
Abstract
We study the problem of \emph{jamming} in multiple independent \emph{Gaussian channels} as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the \emph{waterfilling} to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the best-response strategy of the jammer is the \emph{waterfilling} only to the noise power.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1807.09749,
title = {Jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a game},
author = {Michail Fasoulakis and Apostolos Traganitis and Anthony Ephremides},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.09749},
year = {2018}
}