Related papers: Leveraging Noisy Observations in Zero-Sum Games

We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…

We consider misinformation games, i.e., multi-agent interactions where the players are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an \emph{incorrect} understanding of the game setting, without being aware of…

We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) in which one controller plays an impulse control while their opponent plays a stochastic control. We consider an asymmetric setting in which the impulse player commits to, at the start…

Synergy between evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and fluctuating state of shared resource being consumed by the cooperators is essential for averting the tragedy of the commons. Not only in humans, but also in the cognitively-limited…

We pose Witsenhausen's problem as a leader-follower game of incomplete information. The follower makes a noisy observation of the leader's action (who moves first) and chooses an action minimizing her expected deviation from the leader's…

Limited lookahead has been studied for decades in perfect-information games. We initiate a new direction via two simultaneous deviation points: generalization to imperfect-information games and a game-theoretic approach. We study how one…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

This paper analyzes a simple game with $n$ players. We fix a mean, $\mu$, in the interval $[0, 1]$ and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the…

In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…

Partially observable stochastic games provide a rich mathematical paradigm for modeling multi-agent dynamic decision making under uncertainty and partial information. However, they generally do not admit closed-form solutions and are…

This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

Gameplay under various forms of uncertainty has been widely studied. Feldman et al. (2010) studied a particularly low-information setting in which one observes the opponent's actions but no payoffs, not even one's own, and introduced an…

We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…

We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…

The behaviour of multi-agent learning in competitive settings is often considered under the restrictive assumption of a zero-sum game. Only under this strict requirement is the behaviour of learning well understood; beyond this, learning…

In this work we consider a stochastic linear quadratic two-player game. The state measurements are observed through a switched noiseless communication link. Each player incurs a finite cost every time the link is established to get…

We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\epsilon, \gamma)$-differential privacy, that…

In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the…