Related papers: Leveraging Noisy Observations in Zero-Sum Games

We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…

n infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, is determined. The proof relies on a representation of the game as…

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…

This paper studies a language-based opacity enforcement in a two-player, zero-sum game on a graph. In this game, player 1 (P1) wins if it can achieve a secret temporal goal described by the language of a finite automaton, no matter what…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

We study a two-player zero-sum game in continuous time, where the payoff-a running cost-depends on a Brownian motion. This Brownian motion is observed in real time by one of the players. The other one observes only the actions of his…

This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…

We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding the long-run relationships, which are footstones in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new set of "zero-determinant (ZD)" strategies, which…

We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…

We study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are consistent with observed equilibrium play. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based on convex optimization to address this problem for many classes…

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…

In this paper, the interplay between a class of nonlinear estimators and strategic sensors is studied in several participatory-sensing scenarios. It is shown that for the class of estimators, if the strategic sensors have access to…

Robots deployed to the real world must be able to interact with other agents in their environment. Dynamic game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework for modeling scenarios in which agents have individual objectives and…

The behavior of rational and selfish players (receivers) over a multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channel is investigated using the framework of noncooperative game theory. In contrast to the game-theoretic model of the…

We study the performance of leader-follower noisy consensus networks, and in particular, the relationship between this performance and the locations of the leader nodes. Two types of dynamics are considered (1) noise-free leaders, in which…