Related papers: Bayesian Learning in Mean Field Games
We study the existence of classical solutions to a broad class of local, first order, forward-backward Extended Mean Field Games systems, that includes standard Mean Field Games, Mean Field Games with congestion, and mean field type control…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…
In this paper we study iterative procedures for stationary equilibria in games with large number of players. Most of learning algorithms for games with continuous action spaces are limited to strict contraction best reply maps in which the…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has been…
In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality criterion. Risk-sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an exponential utility function. In…
In this paper, we consider a class of linear quadratic extended mean field games (MFGs) with common noises where the state coefficients and the cost functional vary with the mean field term in a nonlinear way. Based on stochastic maximum…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
We apply the generalized conditional gradient algorithm to potential mean field games and we show its well-posedeness. It turns out that this method can be interpreted as a learning method called fictitious play. More precisely, each step…
We initiate the analysis of the response of computer owners to various offers of defence systems against a cyber-hacker (for instance, a botnet attack), as a stochastic game of a large number of interacting agents. We introduce a simple…
We investigate the increasingly important and common game-solving setting where we do not have an explicit description of the game but only oracle access to it through gameplay, such as in financial or military simulations and computer…
The theory of mean field games aims at studying deterministic or stochastic differential games (Nash equilibria) as the number of agents tends to infinity. Since very few mean field games have explicit or semi-explicit solutions, numerical…
We introduce a nonconvex Mean Field Games system by studying a model with a large number of identical pairs of players who are all rational, and each pair plays an identical zero-sum differential game. We study existence and uniqueness of…
Mean Field Game (MFG) models implicitly assume "rational expectations", meaning that the heterogeneous agents being modeled correctly know all relevant transition probabilities for the complex system they inhabit. When there is common…
We analyze an $N+1$-player game and the corresponding mean field game with state space $\{0,1\}$. The transition rate of $j$-th player is the sum of his control $\alpha^j$ plus a minimum jumping rate $\eta$. Instead of working under…
We consider a deterministic mean field games problem in which a typical agent solves an optimal control problem where the dynamics is affine with respect to the control and the cost functional has a growth which is polynomial with respect…
In this note we prove the uniqueness of solutions to a class of Mean Field Games systems subject to possibly degenerate individual noise. Our results hold true for arbitrary long time horizons and for general non-separable Hamiltonians that…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
This article introduces a novel mean-field game model for multi-sector economic growth in which a dynamically evolving externality, influenced by the collective actions of agents, plays a central role. Building on classical growth theories…