Related papers: Bayesian Learning in Mean Field Games
This article considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion models in which agents aim at reaching a given target set and wish to minimize a cost consisting of an individual running cost, an individual cost depending on the…
We consider a model of Bayesian observational learning in which a sequence of agents receives a private signal about an underlying binary state of the world. Each agent makes a decision based on its own signal and its observations of…
This work is mainly concerned with the so-called limit theory for mean-field games. Adopting the weak formulation paradigm put forward by Carmona and Lacker, we consider a fully non-Markovian setting allowing for drift control and…
This paper is concerned with developing mean-field game models for the evolution of epidemics. Specifically, an agent's decision -- to be socially active in the midst of an epidemic -- is modeled as a mean-field game with health-related…
In this paper, we study a large population game with heterogeneous dynamics and cost functions solving a consensus problem. Moreover, the agents have communication constraints which appear as: (1) an Additive-White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)…
We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number of rounds). The game is adversarially chosen from some…
A dynamic mean field theory is developed for finite state and action Bayesian reinforcement learning in the large state space limit. In an analogy with statistical physics, the Bellman equation is studied as a disordered dynamical system;…
The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may…
We study a class of linear-quadratic mean-field games with incomplete information. For each agent, the state is given by a linear forward stochastic differential equation with common noise. Moreover, both the state and control variables can…
We consider deterministic mean field games where the dynamics of a typical agent is non-linear with respect to the state variable and affine with respect to the control variable. Particular instances of the problem considered here are mean…
We study mean-field games of optimal stopping (OS-MFGs) and introduce an entropy-regularized framework to enable learning-based solution methods. By utilizing randomized stopping times, we reformulate the OS-MFG as a mean-field game of…
In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of…
We establish the first unconditional well-posedness result for the master equation associated with a general class of mean field games of controls. Our analysis covers games with displacement monotone or Lasry--Lions monotone data, as well…
In this paper we study a type of games regularized by the relative entropy, where the players' strategies are coupled through a random environment variable. Besides the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria of such games, we prove that…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…
We study an $N$-player and a mean field exponential utility game. Each player manages two stocks; one is driven by an individual shock and the other is driven by a common shock. Moreover, each player is concerned not only with her own…
This paper provides a mathematical study of the well-posedness of master equation on finite state space involving terms modelling common noise. In this setting, the solution of the master equation depends on an additional variable modelling…
A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…
Finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) arise as limits of large interacting particle systems and are governed by an MFG system, a coupled forward-backward differential equation consisting of a forward Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…