Related papers: Multiple equilibria in mean-field game models for …
Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
Stochastic games provide a framework for interactions among multiple agents and enable a myriad of applications. In these games, agents decide on actions simultaneously, the state of every agent moves to the next state, and each agent…
Platform giants in China have operated with persistently compressed margins in highly concentrated markets for much of the past decade, despite market shares exceeding 60\% in core segments. Standard theory predicts otherwise: either the…
In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all…
We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach…
The goal of the paper is to introduce a set of problems which we call mean field games of timing. We motivate the formulation by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous-time setting. We briefly review the economic and game theoretic…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We…
This paper considers mean field games in a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) framework. Each player has a continuum state and binary action. By active control, a player can bring its state to a resetting point. All players are…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
Wage dispersion and job-to-job mobility are central features of modern labour markets, yet canonical equilibrium search models with exogenous job-offer ladders struggle to jointly account for these facts and the magnitude of frictional wage…
Mean field games are limit models for symmetric $N$-player games with interaction of mean field type as $N\to\infty$. The limit relation is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game allows to construct approximate…
This paper considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion where agents want to leave a given bounded domain through a part of its boundary in minimal time. Each agent is free to move in any direction, but their maximal speed is…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
We investigate the convergence of symmetric stochastic differential games with interactions via control, where the volatility terms of both idiosyncratic and common noises are controlled. We apply the stochastic maximum principle, following…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents' states. Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii)…
We propose a logical framework combining a game-theoretic study of abilities of agents to achieve quantitative objectives in multi-player games by optimizing payoffs or preferences on outcomes with a logical analysis of the abilities of…
Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…