Mean field games of timing and models for bank runs
Probability
2017-01-24 v3 Economics
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to introduce a set of problems which we call mean field games of timing. We motivate the formulation by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous-time setting. We briefly review the economic and game theoretic contributions at the root of our effort, and we develop a mathematical theory for continuous-time stochastic games where the strategic decisions of the players are merely choices of times at which they leave the game, and the interaction between the strategic players is of a mean field nature.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1606.03709,
title = {Mean field games of timing and models for bank runs},
author = {Rene Carmona and Francois Delarue and Daniel Lacker},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.03709},
year = {2017}
}