Related papers: Robust Price Discrimination
We consider the problem of multi-product dynamic pricing, in a contextual setting, for a seller of differentiated products. In this environment, the customers arrive over time and products are described by high-dimensional feature vectors.…
Motivated by the strategic participation of electricity producers in electricity day-ahead market, we study the problem of online learning in repeated multi-unit uniform price auctions focusing on the adversarial opposing bid setting. The…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
We study contextual dynamic pricing, where a decision maker posts personalized prices based on observable contexts and receives binary purchase feedback indicating whether the customer's valuation exceeds the price. Each valuation is…
We study a producer's problem of selling a product to a continuum of privacy-conscious consumers, where the producer can implement third-degree price discrimination, offering different prices to different market segments. We consider a…
We consider a dynamic pricing problem under unknown demand models. In this problem a seller offers prices to a stream of customers and observes either success or failure in each sale attempt. The underlying demand model is unknown to the…
We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets…
Selling a perfectly divisible item to potential buyers is a fundamental task with apparent applications to pricing communication bandwidth and cloud computing services. Surprisingly, despite the rich literature on single-item auctions,…
We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only the equilibrium price and quantity are…
First-price auctions have recently gained significant traction in digital advertising markets, exemplified by Google's transition from second-price to first-price auctions. Unlike in second-price auctions, where bidding one's private…
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness…
We consider decision-making problems involving the optimization of linear objective functions with uncertain coefficients. The probability distribution of the coefficients--which are assumed to be stochastic in nature--is unknown to the…
Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…
We present surrogate regret bounds for arbitrary surrogate losses in the context of binary classification with label-dependent costs. Such bounds relate a classifier's risk, assessed with respect to a surrogate loss, to its cost-sensitive…
Adverse selection is a version of the principal-agent problem that includes monopolist nonlinear pricing, where a monopolist with known costs seeks a profit-maximizing price menu facing a population of potential consumers whose preferences…
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with $m$ items and $n$ budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appraises at some single-value every item in her preference-set.…
We study revenue optimization in a repeated auction between a single seller and a single buyer. Traditionally, the design of repeated auctions requires strong modeling assumptions about the bidder behavior, such as it being myopic, infinite…
We examine fixed-price mechanisms in bilateral trade through the lens of regret minimization. Our main results are twofold. (i) For independent values, a near-optimal $\widetilde{\Theta}(T^{2/3})$ tight bound for $\textsf{Global Budget…